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Abstract. We present an efficient key wrapping scheme that uses a sin-
gle public permutation as the basic element. As the scheme does not rely
on block ciphers, it can be used on a resource-constrained device where
such a permutation comes from an implemented hash function, regular
(SHA-3/Keccak) or lightweight one (Quark, Photon). The scheme is ca-
pable of wrapping keys up to 1400 bits long and processing arbitrarily
long headers. Our scheme easily delivers the security level of 128 bits or
higher with the master key of the same length.
We use the security notion from the concept of Deterministic Authenti-
cated Encryption (DAE) introduced by Rogaway and Shrimpton. Though
the permutation is inevitably modeled as a random permutation, the re-
sulting proof of security is short and easy to verify and hence provide a
reasonable alternative to authentication modes based on block ciphers.
Keywords: Key wrapping, DAE, sponge, Keccak.
1 Introduction
Key wrapping schemes address the problem of key management in distributed
systems. Security architects often limit the lifespan of keys in order to reduce the
risk of the key compromise and lessen the amount of data encrypted on a single
key. Hence keys are regularly updated, and an update protocol using an insecure
channel must be carefully designed. Ideally, it should be simple and efficient.
Practical constraints also limit, if not forbid the use of additional mechanisms
such as nonce or random number generation.
Since the early years of digital cryptography, new keys are encrypted on
(wrapped with) a long-term (master) key shared between a sender and a re-
ceiver. Confidentiality of the new key must be ensured and its integrity must be
protected. A key might be bounded to a header, which is not encrypted (e.g.,
for routing purposes) but authenticated. Therefore, the key wrapping scheme
is a special case of authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
schemes [23], where nonces and random numbers are avoided. Such a scheme
may serve not only for key update, but also for a robust and misuse-resistant
general purpose encryption [25].
Traditional AEAD schemes provide confidentiality (e.g., ciphertexts are in-
distinguishable from random strings) and data authenticity (ciphertexts con-
structed by an adversary must decrypt to invalid). They employ randomness or
nonces and can be almost as efficient as regular encryption modes [20]. It has
been clear that a deterministic scheme would require at least two passes over
data to make each output bit depend on each input bit.
When the NIST addressed the key wrapping schemes in the series of recom-
mendations (since at least 2001), its designs, later called AES-KW and AKW [21],
were highly inefficient. Moreover, those schemes carried no formal security claims
or proofs. This was natural, as the first formal treatment of this problem ap-
peared only in 2006 [25] as the concept of the Deterministic Authenticated En-
cryption (DAE). Still, only a few key wrapping schemes have been proposed so
far in DAE or similar frameworks: SIV [25], HBS [19], BTM [18], Hash-then-
Encrypt [15,22].
None of these proposals are universal solutions. AES-KW requires 12-fold as
many operations as to encrypt the same amount of data, SIV needs two keys and
is not parallelizable, and the Hash-then-Encrypt template can not be scaled to a
general-purpose encryption mode. Third-party analysis of these constructions is
often difficult because of lengthy and complicated proofs of security. The recently
found flaw in the security proof of GCM [17] emphasizes the need for clarity and
extensive third-party verification of provably secure schemes.
All these designs employ a block cipher, and the natural choice of AES limits
their security level to 64 bits1. To obtain the 128-bit security or higher, one
would need a block cipher with a 256-bit block or larger. Except for Threefish, a
component of the Skein hash function [14], no other 256-bit blockcipher enjoyed
significant attention from cryptanalysts.
However, block ciphers are not the only source of good permutations. Quite
recently, the hash function Keccak [5], which employs a 1600-bit permutation,
has been selected as the new standard SHA-3. We expect that it will be widely
deployed in the near future, and hence its building block will be readily accessible
to other cryptographic applications. On resource-constrained devices, where the
space is limited, it would be very tempting to use a single cryptographic primi-
tive, such as the Keccak permutation, for many purposes. Whenever Keccak or
AES are considered too expensive for a device, some lightweight hash functions
like Spongent [9] and Quark [2] are also based on a single permutation and may
offer it for other schemes.
This idea also fits the recent paradigm of the permutation-based cryptogra-
phy [11] as opposed to the blockcipher-based cryptography. From the practical
point of view, it would allow to have a single permutation for all purposes,
whereas it would simplify the analysis as a target for a cryptanalyst would be
much simpler. Permutation-based modes of operation draw attention after the
selection of Keccak, as indicated by two recent proposals for the authenticated
encryption: APE(X) [8] and PPAE [7].
If the Keccak permutation is selected, the available 1600 bits are often suffi-
cient to carry the master key, the new key, and the associated data. Hence for the
design of a key wrapping scheme we could restrict the use of a permutation to a
1 Here the key size of AES, which can be 128, 192, or 256, does not play a significant
role: many modes of operation can not be proven secure as long as inputs to the
blockcipher start colliding.
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single call and obtain a scheme with a reasonably short proof of security. The se-
curity model, however, would be different from the one used in blockcipher-based
schemes. Since we use a single permutation, the most natural is to model it as
randomly drawn and hence prove the security in the random-oracle model. An
alternative approach, the Even-Mansour construction, would provide the secu-
rity proof in the standard model but with weaker bounds (see the further text).
Though the random-permutation model is clearly more demanding to the prim-
itive we use, we argue that a shorter and simpler security proof and increased
security level would compensate the weakening of the model.
Our proposal. We present a new key wrapping scheme with a variable security
level and a proof of security that is easy to verify. We call it KWF, as it is based
not on a block cipher but on a fixed permutation such as those used in sponge
hash functions (SHA-3/Keccak, Quark).
A wide permutation (up to 1600 bits in Keccak) easily delivers the security
level of 128 bits or higher when using the key of the same length. Associated data
(header) is processed with an unkeyed cryptographic hash function, possibly the
same from which the permutation comes. Apart from the header processing, the
scheme has no overhead over a single permutation call. We limit the message
length to at max 1411 bits, but this must be sufficient for wrapping all symmetric
keys and many asymmetric private keys (e.g., elliptic curve keys).
Our scheme is about as efficient as the hash function from which the permu-
tation comes. If the associated data H is processed with the same hash function,
wrapping H and M takes roughly the same time as hashing H||M . We recom-
mend using a narrow-block permutation for shorter inputs. We also note that
the key length can be freely chosen.
Our scheme, as well as other DAE-conformant designs, is also fine for general-
purpose encryption and authenticated encryption of short inputs (though we
avoid explicitly offering the scheme for general use because of length constraints).
To emphasize this opportunity, we use the notion message for keys and other
inputs that are encrypted by our scheme.
Security proof and random oracles. We accompany our design with a proof of
security in the DAE framework, where we additionally allow the an adversary to
query the randomly drawn permutation. Here we follow the strategy of proving
the indistinguishability of the generalized Even-Mansour scheme from the ran-
dom permutation [10]. Our assumption establishes the security of our scheme as
long as the permutation we eventually fix has no untrivial properties (which so
far holds for Keccak and other sponge functions). We tried to make our proof
as simple as possible to encourage its third-party verification.
We note that there are two possible approaches to constructing and proving
the security of symmetric schemes:
– Use a blockcipher as a primitive and prove the security assuming that it is
a secure PRP;
– Use a concrete hash function or a public permutation as a primitive and
prove the security assuming it is randomly drawn.
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It is customary to consider the former approach more reliable as it is less
demanding to the primitive and hence withstands a larger set of attacks against
the primitive. Hence the scheme secure in the standard model is considered
better than the one assuming a random oracle. However, the latter approach is
arguably better from designer’s point of view. One may go further and argue
that, it should be easier to construct a single “good” permutation and use it,
e.g., for a hash function, than to construct a family of them for a blockcipher,
where a key selects a particular permutation, and all these permutations should
be significantly different.
A part of our research is to investigate whether a single permutation gives
an elegant scheme with a short security proof in the area of authenticated en-
cryption. If we succeed, this would benefit the permutation-based cryptography
and eventually the cryptographic community by giving various schemes with
verifiable proofs.
Related work. We already mentioned other designs that aim for key wrapping
and deterministic authenticated encryption. NIST has published its first key
wrapping scheme around 2001 (see description in [21]). AES-KW is a sort of
generalized Feistel scheme, where the key to and the header are divided into
64-bit blocks, and the round function is the AES applied to two leftmost blocks.
No analysis of this scheme has been published, though it is believed [25] that
the security level is somewhere between 64 and 128 bits. There are several mod-
ifications to this scheme, known as KW and KWP, and a special version that
uses Triple-DES.
Rogaway and Shrimpton proposed the scheme SIV, which computes MAC
of the message and header with a PRF under key K1 and uses it as the IV in
an IV-based encryption scheme with key K2 [25]. The concrete proposal invokes
CMAC and CTR. The scheme SIV is provably secure in the strongest model
— DAE — where the adversary can choose plaintexts and ciphertexts but is
unable to distinguish the pair of encryption and decryption oracles from the
pair of “random-bits” and “always invalid” oracles. Scheme HBS [19] and its
refinement BTM [18] by Iwata and Yasuda use polynomial hash functions for
MAC and a modified CTR mode. Similarly to CMAC, secondary keys are derived
out of a single key by encrypting constants. HBS and BTM are provably secure
in the DAE setting.
Gennaro and Halevi proposed the general template of Hash-then-Encrypt [15],
which may be viewed as weakening of SIV. Here a PRF is replaced with a hash
function, which might not even be collision resistant. for instance, they showed
that a composition of universal hashing and CTR mode is secure. However, the
performance is gained at the cost of weakening the model. Confidentiality is
achieved in the assumption of random plaintexts (RPA), where the adversary
obtains two plaintexts (out of his control) and one of corresponding ciphertexts,
and he has to guess which one. This “left-or-right” setting is provably weaker
than DAE, but is still sufficient for key wrapping schemes where inputs have
enough entropy. Osaki and Iwata [22] continued work in this direction and in-
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troduced a special class of universal hash functions which are fine to use with
ECB or CBC.
The Keccak team presented an authenticated encryption mode SpongeWrap,
which under certain circumstances and proper formatting of plaintext and head-
ers may serve for the key wrapping [4]. However, the paper [4] is quite vague on
this topic, and it was later confirmed [1] that the key wrapping was not among
the main applications of SpongeWrap. Quite recently, a misuse-resistant authen-
ticated encryption scheme APE(X) has been presented [8], but the paper was
not available to the author at the time of submission.
On Even-Mansour ciphers. Our construction may resemble a variant of the
Even-Mansour cipher [13], where a single permutation F is turned to a block-
cipher EK(X) = K ⊕ F(X ⊕K). The resulting cipher is provably secure up to
2n/2 queries to both blockcipher and permutation [12] when the key is as wide
as the permutation. It may be tempting to construct a key wrapping scheme by
taking a wide permutation and a short key, and encrypt a plaintext with some
redundancy. This would reduce the security of the whole scheme to the PRP
security of the Even-Mansour cipher and hence provide a desirable proof in the
standard model.
However, this approach is dangerous, as reducing the key length also reduces
the overall security. Indeed, when the key length k < n, one may ask to encrypt
2k/2 plaintexts which are constant in the bytes not touched by the key. In the
oﬄine stage, an adversary also applies the permutation to these inputs and
searches for a collision between two groups of outputs in the last n−k bits. This
allows to recover the key with complexity 2k/2 whereas our construction does
not have a security loss up to 2k operations. Therefore, an Even-Mansour cipher
can not be used as is, and a more sophisticated PRP candidate would be needed
to get a scheme provably secure in the standard model.
Outline of the paper. We recall the syntax of key wrapping schemes and relevant
security definitions in Section 2. Then we describe our proposal KWF in Sec-
tion 3 and also recommend a set of permutations for various security levels. We
immediately proceed with the security proof of KWF in Section 4. We survey
the existing key wrapping schemes in the Conclusion.
2 Syntax and security of key wrapping schemes
2.1 Syntax
A key wrapping scheme Π is a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme and is
defined as a pair of functions E and D, which provide encryption and decryption,
respectively. The secret key K, shared between parties, belongs to the key space
K. The encryption function takes the key to be wrapped from the message space
M and encrypts it to a ciphertext C ∈ C. If the scheme is able to authenticate
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some data without encrypting it, it is called the associated data (AD). The
associated data space is denoted by H, hence
E : K ×H×M → C.
The decryption function takes a key, a ciphertext, and possibly associated
data as input and returns either a plaintext (wrapped key) from the message
space or the invalid message ⊥:
D : K ×H× C → M∪ {⊥}.
The key wrapping scheme differs from the probabilistic (regular) authenticated
encryption schemes as it does not use any random numbers or nonces.
Clearly, the produced ciphertext decrypts back to the plaintext if the same
associated data is used:
D (K,H, (E(K,H,M))) = M.
The purpose of a key wrapping scheme, as well as of a regular authenticated
encryption scheme, is to achieve:
– Privacy by making all the ciphertexts “look randomly”.
– Data authenticity by making all the ciphertexts not produced by the key
owner “decrypt to invalid”.
Hence the receiver may verify that the unwrapped key is authentic as otherwise
the ciphertext would decrypt to invalid. Let us introduce these notions formally.
2.2 Security
Rogaway and Shrimpton [25] were the first who introduced a single notion that
amalgamates both privacy and authenticity properties of a key wrapping scheme.
They called it Deterministic Authenticated Encryption (DAE). Gennaro and
Halevi proposed a weaker notion of security (RPA+INT), where the plaintexts
are randomly chosen and are out of adversary’s control. We prove the security
of KWF in a strengthened version of DAE, so our scheme is secure for general-
purpose encryption where the adversary may control the plaintexts.
The security of a DAE scheme is defined as the inability to distinguish be-
tween the two worlds, where an adversary has access to two oracles [25]. One
world consists of the encryption oracle E(·, ·) and decryption oracle D(·, ·), where
the secret key is randomly chosen. The second world consists of the “random-
bits” oracle $(·, ·) and the “always-invalid” oracle ⊥ (·, ·) (Figure 1).
This setting serves well for encryption schemes based on secure PRPs and
authentication schemes based on secure PRFs. We only have to make a couple
of refinements. As we work with a single permutation, we have to additionally
allow the adversary to access it. Moreover, we have to model it as randomly
drawn [3, 6], which in turn requires us to assume that the permutation has no
nontrivial properties.
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Fig. 1. Indistinguishability setting for DAE.
We also slightly refine the definition of the “random-bit” oracle $(·, ·) with
the following motivation. Since the encryption is invertible, an ideal encryption
scheme with a fixed key and associated data should be a permutation. Hence
it is natural to model the oracle $(·, ·) as an ideal cipher — a set of randomly
chosen permutations indexed by a key. Here the associated data serves as a key.
This model allows for an increased security level and a tighter bound, since a
traditional proof of security for an encryption mode invokes a PRF and then
applies the PRF-to-PRP switching lemma. This lemma limits the security level
with the birthday bound, which we would like to avoid.
Definition 1. Let Π = (K, E [F ],D[F ]) be a DAE scheme based on permutation
F . Let the adversary A have the access to F . The DAE advantage of A in
breaking Π is computed as follows:
AdvdaeΠ (A) = Pr
[
K
$←− K, F(·) $←− Perm(n) : AEK [F ](·,·),DK [F ](·,·) ⇒ 1
]
−
− Pr
[
F(·) $←− Perm(n) : A$(·,·),⊥(·,·) ⇒ 1
]
.
On query (H,X) the oracle $(·, ·) returns a random string of length n so that
it is a permutation (bijective function) for every H. The set of all permutations
over {0, 1}n is denoted by Perm(n). The ⊥ (·, ·) oracle always returns ⊥ (invalid).
We exclude trivial wins: the adversary shall not ask (H,Y ) of its right oracle if
some previous left oracle query of (H,X) returned Y and vice versa. Without
loss of generality, the adversary does not repeat a query and does not ask left
queries outside of H ×M. Here and in the further text we implicitly assume
that F−1 is available together with F .
The maximum advantage as a function of the number of allowed queries is
the natural quantitative measure of the security of a key wrapping schemes:
AdvdaeΠ (q)
def
= maxAAdv
dae
Π (A),
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where we take maximum over all adversaries asking at maximum q queries to
all oracles.
3 Our proposal: KWF
3.1 Notation
For two bit strings X and Y of the same length, X⊕Y is their xor. For an integer
n ≥ 1, {0, 1}n is the set of all bit strings of n bits, and {0, 1}m..n is the set of
strings of m to n bits long. Also Xm..n denotes the substring of X containing
bits with indices from m to n, where the first index is 1. We write X
$←− X for
sampling an element from the set X uniformly at random.
3.2 Description of KWF
Our scheme provides an authenticated encryption of short messages and is based
on a fixed n-bit permutation F . Of the n-bit input, k bits are devoted to the
key K, l bits to the associated data H, and n− k− l to the message M . As the
associated data needs only authentication, we map a possibly long string H to an
l-bit value with a cryptographic hash function G. G should be collision-resistant,
and it should return some valid output on empty input (if it requires redefinition
of G, the new function shall still be collision-resistant).
We define scheme KWF formally as Π = (K, E [F ],D[F ]), where:
1.
K = {0, 1}k — the key space;
H = {0, 1}0..t — the associated data (AD) space;
M = {0, 1}1..(n−k−l−1) — the message space;
C = {0, 1}n — the ciphertext space.
2.
G : {0, 1}0..t −→ {0, 1}l — hash function for the associated data;
pad : {0, 1}1..(n−k−l−1) −→ {0, 1}n−k−l — invertible padding function;
F : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n — fixed permutation.
3. E [F ] : K ×H×M −→ C — encryption function (Figure 2):{
EK [F ](H,M) = F (K||G(H)||pad[M ]))⊕
(
K||0n−k) .
4. D[F ] : K × H × {0, 1}n −→ M ∪ {⊥} — decryption function. The output
DK [F ](H,C) is computed as follows:
(a) X ← F−1(C ⊕ (K||0n−k)).
(b) If X1..k 6= K, return ⊥.
(c) If Xk+1..k+l 6= G(H) return ⊥.
(d) Return pad−1(Xk+l+1..n).
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Fig. 2. Our proposal: KWF.
3.3 Recommended parameters
In Section 4 we prove that the adversary asking at most q encryption and de-
cryption queries has the maximum advantage of
2AdvcollG (q) +
2.5q
2k
+
8.5q2
2n−k
,
where AdvcollG (q) is the maximum advantage of the adversary trying to violate
the collision resistance of G after making q queries to G (a more rigorous reduction
to collision resistance is presented in Section B. We assume that for a collision-
resistant hash function:
AdvcollG (q) ≤
q2
2l
.
Then to get the security level of S bits, the following constraints are sufficient:
k ≥ S, l ≥ 2S, n ≥ 2S + k.
Therefore, for 80-bit master keys and 80-bit (padded) plaintexts we need n ≥
320, and for 128-bit keys and plaintexts — n ≥ 512.
There are several families of sponge hash functions that provide suitable
permutations for KWF. The Keccak family [5] uses permutations of width n =
25 · 2l, l = 0..6, with n = 1600 chosen for SHA-3. Keccak permutations are
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reasonably efficient in software and hardware, and are natural choice whenever
SHA-3 is implemented on the platform. We propose to use n = 400, 800, 1600
and denote them as Keccak-n. It is natural to use the Keccak hash function
also for the associated data. By Keccak/t we denote the sponge hash function
using the 1600-bit Keccak permutation with capacity 2t and rate 1600−2t. The
function Keccak/256 is to be standardized as SHA-3-256.
As far as we know, the key wrapping schemes are also deployed on smart
cards. Hence we would like to offer a portfolio of permutations for KWF that are
suitable for resource-constrained platforms. Quark [2], Photon [16], and Spon-
gent [9] are recently proposed families of lightweight hash functions based on
the sponge construction. They use permutations from 88 to 768 bits wide and
were not shown any internal weaknesses. Depending on the message length and
the security level, permutations from 256 to 768 bits can be recommended for
KWF. Some more details are given in Appendix A and the summary in Table 2.
Whenever SHA-2 is implemented on the platform, it also can be used as the
hash function for the associated data. The most suitable for KWF are SHA-224
and SHA-256.
Some permutations are significantly faster than their inverses, e.g., the Kec-
cak permutations. Assuming that the receiver in the key wrapping scheme is
more resource-constrained, we propose to use the inverse of such permutation
for encryption, and hence the forward call for the decryption.
4 Security of KWF
Our main result states that if an adversary can not violate the collision resistance
of G and makes fewer than min(2(n−k)/2, 2k) queries, she is unlikely to violate the
security of KWF as a DAE scheme. The term AdvcollG (q) in our bound quantifies
the ability of the adversary making at most q queries to G to find a colliding
pair. A more rigorous formulation of our results can be found in Appendix.
Theorem 1. The DAE advantage of an adversary attacking KWF and asking
the total of at most q queries to all oracles and F is bounded as follows:
AdvdaeΠ (q) ≤ 2AdvcollG (q) +
2.5q
2k
+
8.5q2
2n−k
.
Proof. We split this expression in two following the approach in [25]:
Pr
[
K
$←− K, F(·) $←− Perm(n) : AEK [F ],DK [F ] ⇒ 1
]
−
− Pr
[
F(·) $←− Perm(n) : A$,⊥ ⇒ 1
]
=
= Pr
[
AEK [F ],DK [F ] ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
AEK [F ],⊥ ⇒ 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1
+
+ Pr
[
AEK [F ],⊥ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A$,⊥ ⇒ 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p2
.
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4.1 Bounding p1 (authenticity proof)
Consider
p1 = Pr
[
AEK [F ],DK [F ] ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
AEK [F ],⊥ ⇒ 1
]
,
where K and F are randomly chosen.
We assume without loss of generality that A halts and outputs 1 whenever
the right oracle returns M 6=⊥. Prior to this event, both oracle pairs behave
identically as (EK [F ],⊥). Therefore, p1 is bounded by the probability that A
asks a right-oracle query (H,Y ) so that DK(H,Y ) 6=⊥.
Let us denote the set of ciphertexts obtained prior to this query by C, the
set of F responses and F−1 queries by Fo, and of F queries and F−1 responses
by Fi.
By definition, the adversary is unable to use a pair (H,Y ) where Y has
been a response Y = EK(H,X) for some X. Hence either Y /∈ C, or Y =
EK(H ′, X), H ′ 6= H. In the latter case the ciphertext decrypts to G(H ′)||X, so
the decryption returns ⊥ unless H and H ′ form a collision pair for G. Here the
success rate of the collision search for G is bounded by AdvcollG (q).
If Y /∈ C, then
Pr [DK(H,Y ) 6=⊥] ≤ Pr [DK(H,Y ) 6=⊥ | (Y ⊕K) /∈ Fo] +
+ Pr [DK(H,Y ) 6=⊥ | (Y ⊕K) ∈ Fo] .
Let us now estimate both addends of the right side.
– (Y ⊕ K) /∈ Fo (here and further we shortly write Y ⊕ K instead of Y ⊕
(K||0n−k)). Then the permutation F−1 is asked with a fresh query, so its
output is uniformly distributed along previously unallocated values. The
decryption returns invalid if
F−1(Y ⊕K)1..k+l 6= K||G(H).
Hence at maximum 2n−k−l values pass this condition. As at minimum 2n−q
values remain unassigned, we obtain
Pr [DK(H,Y ) 6=⊥ | (Y ⊕K) /∈ Fo] ≤ 2
n−k−l
2n − q . (1)
– (Y ⊕K) ∈ Fo. Hence the decryption oracle ask the permutation with a query
that is not fresh. Then the decryption returns ⊥ if
F−1(Y ⊕K) 6= K||Z
for any Z. We say that the input clash (IC) occurs, if (K||Z) ∈ Fi for some
Z. Hence without the input clash the decryption error is guaranteed:
Pr [DK(H,Y ) 6=⊥ | (Y ⊕K) ∈ Fo, no IC occurred] = 0.
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Finally,
Pr [DK(H,Y ) 6=⊥ | no IC occurred] ≤ 2
n−k−l
2n − q .
and
p1 = Adv
coll
G (q) +
[
1−
(
1− 2
n−k−l
2n − q
)q]
+ Pr(IC; q) ≤
≤ AdvcollG (q) +
2q
2k+l
+ Pr(IC; q).
It remains to bound the probability Pr(IC; q) of getting the input clash after
q queries. Here either the adversary tries to guess the key in F queries or hopes
to obtain it as a prefix in F−1 responses. In the worst case, when all the q prefixes
are different, the probability of having K among them is bounded by q/2k, so
we have the following bound on the input clash:
Pr(IC; q) ≤ q
2k
. (2)
This gives the final bound on p1:
p1 ≤ AdvcollG (q) +
2q
2k+l
+
q
2k
. (3)
4.2 Bounding p2 (privacy proof)
Recall that
p2 = Pr
[
AEK [F ],⊥ ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
A$,⊥ ⇒ 1
]
,
where K and F are chosen randomly.
We can drop the oracle ⊥ simply by considering the adversary B that has
access to the left oracle only and runs A. She transfers queries of A directly to
the oracles and returns ⊥ to all queries by A to the right oracle. Hence
p2 ≤ Pr
[
BEK [F ] ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
B$ ⇒ 1
]
.
In the further text we show that in the absence of two events, so called
the output clash and the oracle repetition, oracles EK [F ] and $ produce identi-
cally distributed results and hence are indistinguishable. The clashes and some
remarks on how they can be exploited are depicted in Figure 3.
Let us go to the details. Consider the query (H,X) to the encryption oracle
E or $. Denote by C the set of encryption oracle responses obtained beforehand.
We are also interested in the last (n−k) bits of ciphertext, which are unaffected
by the key addition. We denote C|k+1..n by Ĉ and use the same notation for
(n− k)-bit suffixes of Fo denoted by F̂o.
Let us say that the encryption oracle response C = EK(H,X) causes the
output clash if Ĉ ∈ F̂o, i.e. the ciphertext collides with one of stored permutation
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Fig. 3. Detection and exploit of the clashes. In case of input clash we encrypt
(n−k)-bit suffix X of the permutation query K||X and detect suffix collision in
outputs. In case of output clash some ciphertext prefixes are forbidden, which
allow to distinguish the encryption from the ideal cipher.
outputs on the last n − k bits. Let V be the set of the ciphertexts that did not
occur in previous responses and do not cause the output clash:
V def=
[
{0, 1}k ×
(
{0, 1}n−k \ F̂o
)]
\ E.
Lemma 1. If the input clash did not occur and G(H) does not collide with any
previous such value, then all responses EK(H,X) ∈ V are equiprobable.
Proof. Since there was no input clash and no collision, the inputK||G(H)||pad[X]
has not been queried to the permutation. Hence, it is fresh, and its output is uni-
formly taken from {0, 1}n \ C. It remains to remove from this set the values that
cause the output clash, i.e. the set {0, 1}k ×
(
{0, 1}n−k \ F̂o
)
. This concludes
the proof.
The ideal cipher has a different distribution, as its outputs may collide for
distinct H. Let us say that the oracle repetition (OR) occurs if $(H,X) =
$(H ′, X ′) for some previously queried (H ′, X ′). If we exclude the oracle repetition
and output clash events, the distribution will be the same:
$(H,X)
$ | no OR, no OC, no Coll←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− V.
Combining with Lemma 1, we conclude that if no input clash, no output clash,
and no oracle repetition occurs, the encryption oracles produce identically dis-
tributed responses and are indistinguishable. Therefore,
p2 ≤ Pr(IC; q) + Pr(OC for E | no IC; q) + Pr(OC for $(·, ·); q)+
+ Pr(OR) + AdvcollG (q). (4)
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Output clash bound. Provided no input clash and no collision in G, a query
E(H,X) yields a fresh query to F . Hence the output is uniformly distributed
among at least 2n−q previously unassigned values, of which at maximum q×2k
cause the output clash. Therefore, assuming q ≤ 2k
Pr
( ̂E(H,X) ∈ F̂o) ≤ q2k
2n − q ≤
2q
2n−k
.
Thus we have the following bound:
Pr(OC for E | no IC; q) ≤ 1−
(
1− 2q
2n−k
)q
≤ 4q
2
2n−k
. (5)
The bound for the ideal cipher is the same:
Pr
( ̂$(H,X) ∈ F̂o) ≤ q · 2k
2n − q =⇒ Pr(OC for $(·, ·); q) ≤
4q2
2n−k
. (6)
Oracle repetition bound. We calculate the probability of the event that during q
queries to the PRP-oracle $ there is no collision in outputs. Consider i-th query.
The oracle chooses its output uniformly out of at least (2n − q) possibilities, of
which at maximum q cause a collision. Hence
Pr(OR; q) = 1−
q∏
i=1
(
2n − 2q
2n − q
)
= 1−
(
1− q
2n − q
)q
≤ 1− e− 2q
2
2n ≤ 3q
2
2n
. (7)
We substitute Equations (2), (5), (6), and (7) to Equation (8) and obtain the
final bound
p2 ≤ q
2k
+
8q2
2n−k
+
3q2
2n
+ AdvcollG (q). (8)
Then we sum Equations (3) and (8) and get:
AdvdaeΠ (q) ≤ AdvcollG (q) +
2q
2k+l
+
q
2k
+
q
2k
+
8q2
2n−k
+
3q2
2n
+ AdvcollG (q) ≤
≤ 2AdvcollG (q) +
2.5q
2k
+
8.5q2
2n−k
.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
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6 Conclusion
We have described a new key wrapping scheme — KWF. It is based on a single
fixed permutation, with a lot of candidate permutations available in sponge de-
signs: Keccak/SHA-3, Quark, Spongent, Photon. Though keys to be wrapped are
limited to the length of 1411 bits, our scheme still provides a simple and efficient
key update protocol for most of symmetric and several asymmetric cryptosys-
tems. It can also bind the associated data to the message, and is able to prepro-
cess it without the master key. The ciphertext length is equal to the permutation
width n, while the master key length k can vary.
We recalled several alternative schemes and concluded that KWF is a viable
alternative when a user wants to achieve 128-bit security within a simple design.
Though the security of KWF is proven in the random-permutation model, we
showed that no similar schemes secure in the standard model have the same
features, and the Even-Mansour construction needs a careful amplification to
suit the 128-bit security requirement.
The scheme is provably secure in the refined concept of DAE, where we
add the adversarial access to the permutation. Assuming no weakness in the
permutation and a collision resistant hash function for the associated data, the
violation of DAE property is unlikely for the number of queries q ≤ 2k. Hence
the security level of 128 bits is easy to deliver, which is not the case for other
key wrapping schemes using AES.
A scalable version of our scheme, which would process arbitrarily long mes-
sages and remain simple and secure, is an object for the future work.
We believe that there are numerous different applications where DAE schemes
can be used. Whereas one might need 128-bit security level at first, another would
want to process arbitrary long messages. We have constructed a comparative ta-
ble to demonstrate that KWF may find its own niche (Table 1). The overhead is
here defined as the ratio of extra blockcipher calls compared to the sole encryp-
tion of the same data; we simply divide the permutation width by the message
length. The expansion is the the number of extra bits compared to the ciphertext
of the same data. We also compare the need of block cipher or a hash function,
the ability to preprocess the header in advance, and the ability to deliver 128-bit
security with recommended parameters (usually AES for other schemes).
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A Lightweight permutations for KWF
Here we recommend for KWF some particular permutations taken from the
lightweight hash function families: Quark, Photon, Spongent.
The Quark family [2] offers compact and low-power hash functions best suit-
able for RFID technology and other resource-constrained platforms. It uses per-
mutations of width n = 136, 176, 256. Here n = 256 (s-Quark) is a good can-
didate for KWF operating on 64-bit keys and plaintexts, and u- and d-Quark
(n = 136, 176) can be chosen as the hash function G with the 64-bit and 80-bit
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level of collision resistance, respectively. We denote Quark permutations of width
n by Quark-n.
The Photon family [16] is an AES-based lightweight hash function design
with permutations of width 100, 144, 196, 256, 288. We denote its permutations
of width n by Photon-n and recommend using Photon-288 for applications with
64-bit level security. The hash functions Photon/n offer n/2-bit of security for
collision resistance and are suitable for processing associated data.
The Spongent family [9] is another lightweight hash function design with
permutations of width from 88 to 768 bits, with all widths multiple of 4 bits
available. Its permutations Spongent-n can be used for all security levels, with
a particular choice optimized for the input length.
Hash function for AD Message length Permutation
Security level and key length: 64
Keccak/128, u-Quark, Photon/128 0..63
Keccak-400, Quark-256,
Photon-288, Spongent-256
Keccak/128, u-Quark, Photon/128 64..212 Keccak-400, Spongent-400
Keccak/128, u-Quark, Photon/128 213..612 Keccak-800
Keccak/128, u-Quark, Photon/128 613..1412 Keccak-1600
Security level and key length: 80
Keccak/160, d-Quark, Photon/160 0..160 Keccak-400, Spongent-400
Keccak/160, d-Quark, Photon/160 161..560 Keccak-800
Keccak/160, d-Quark, Photon/160 561..1360 Keccak-1600
Security level and key length: 112
SHA-224, Keccak/224, s-Quark 0..464 Keccak-800
SHA-224, Keccak/224, s-Quark 465..1264 Keccak-1600
Security level and key length: 128
SHA-256, Keccak/256 0..415 Keccak-800
SHA-256, Keccak/256 416..1215 Keccak-1600
Table 2. Recommended parameters for scheme KWF. All the numbers are bit
lengths.
B Security of KWF via the concept of human ignorance
Now we attempt to deal more rigorously with the collision resistance of the hash
function G that processes the header.
We can do this by following the “human ignorance” concept introduced by
Rogaway [24]. First, we introduce the variant of our scheme called KWF’. Then
we show that for any adversary A breaking KWF we can explicitly construct an
adversary C violating the collision resistance of G and an adversary B violating
the DAE security of KWF’ so that their total advantage exceeds the advantage
of A. Then we bound the advantage of B.
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Let KWF’ be the version of KWF, where the headers are l-bit long and the
function G is an identity function. Hence G(H) can be simply replaced by H.
Lemma 2. The DAE advantage of an adversary attacking instantiation Π ′ of
KWF’ and asking the total of at most q queries to all oracles and F is bounded
as follows:
AdvdaeΠ′ (q) ≤
2.5q
2k
+
8.5q2
2n−k
.
Proof. The proof of this lemma repeats the proof of Theorem 1 with a small
refinement: G(H) is everywhere replaced with H, so distinct H always yield
distinct inputs to E and F . Hence the overall bound remains the same with the
collision search term removed.
Lemma 3. There exist (and are explicitly constructed in the proof) the adver-
sary B attacking Π ′ and the adversary C attacking the collision resistance of a
hash function such that for any G and any adversary A attacking instantiation
Π of KWF
AdvdaeΠ (A) ≤ AdvdaeΠ′ (BA,G) +AdvcollG (CA,G).
Adversary B asks the same number of queries as A to his oracles, and adversary
C asks at maximum the same number of queries to G as A asks to his oracles.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the security proof of the hash-then-PRF
folklore algorithm, which extends the domain of a PRF by hashing the input,
in [24]. Adversary B is constructed as follows. He has access to A and G, runs
A as an oracle, and forwards all his requests to oracles E and D to his own
instantiations of them for KWF’. Whenever A halts, B outputs the same bit.
Adversary C also runs A as an oracle and emulates the oracle pair ($,⊥)
for him. In addition he computes and stores G(H) for each H queried by A.
Whenever a collision is found, C halts and outputs it.
Then we try to bound AdvdaeΠ (A) −AdvdaeΠ′ (BA,G). Since B and A behave
identically when their worlds consist of real encryption/decryption oracles, we
obtain that
AdvdaeΠ (A)−AdvdaeΠ′ (BA,G) = Pr
[
BA,G [$,⊥]]− Pr [A[$,⊥]] ≤
≤ Pr [A makes queries colliding in G] = AdvcollG (CA,G),
where the last equation follows from the definition of C and the inequality comes
from the fact that A and B may behave differently only if A makes queries which
contain colliding H.
The next theorem immediately follows from these two lemmas and is a more
rigorous version of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. There exist (and are explicitly constructed in the proof) the adver-
sary B attacking KWF’ and the adversary C attacking the collision resistance
of a hash function such that for any G and any adversary A attacking KWF
AdvdaeΠ (A) ≤
2.5q
2k
+
8.5q2
2n−k
+AdvcollG (C).
19
